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The point of this brief article is to propose a better interpre-
tative method on the subject of the bomber command 
controversy at the Canadian War Museum (CWM). My own
interest was piqued mainly by a score of emails on the British
Columbia Museums Association “listserve” late this summer,
wherein many of our region’s museologists hotly debated
both the morality of such warfare and a museum’s proper
position in the face of heavy outside pressure to remove or
revise offending displays. Additionally, I flew in such aircraft
as a RCAF navigator during the 1950s and 1960s before
embarking upon another career as a museum history curator,
so I feel pulled several ways in an issue that has become
deep-felt for me: what is more important to portray, the
authentic voices of aircrew veterans or scholarly historical
perspectives? Plainly, each has its place, and taken overall,
even the newly revised CWM exhibits, when seen, give more
weight to the former. The museum took a huge shortcut in
portraying a dynamite subject.
Strategic aerial bombing originated in World War One when
key transportation centres or military installations well
behind enemy lines were targeted and attacked by long range
aircraft as a means of crippling whole or part armies in the
field. During the 1930s in China, Ethiopia, and Spain, civilian
populations were affected by terror bombing, the method 
of creating large scale urban chaos to impede the enemy’s
mobility or defences. By the middle of World War Two, 
strategic bomber doctrine was split: hit core industrial or
infrastructure targets by daylight “pinpoint attacks” (USAAF),
or attack major cities to destroy civilian morale and war
enthusiasm through nighttime “carpet bombing” (RAF/RCAF).
Later, the American long range bombing of Japan was also
aimed at cities, first with massive incendiary bomb raids 
followed by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki. If these horrors were not enough, the Cold War
offered virtually complete annihilation by either long range
jet bomber fleets, submarine launched ballistic missiles, or
ultimately, ICBMs dropping from sub-orbital trajectories —
and all carrying thermonuclear (hydrogen bomb) weapons.
The source of the CWM’s failure to properly communicate with
visitors on the full nature and scope of strategic bombing
(far beyond Canada’s involvement alone) is a twofold flaw,
one part systemic, the other structural. In the first instance,
start-up budgeting is the primary fault; in the second, the
curators’ work towards a comprehensive portrait of Canada’s
military past compounds the problem. Specifically, here’s
what went wrong from the outset:
• Treasury Boards systematically expect modern 
government-funded museums to use their start-up 
funds to construct and fill the buildings. In the 
instances of history institutions, that automatically 
means creating permanent exhibits because a 
process of changing displays costs so much to again 
and again prepare and install. Such is definitely the 
case of the CWM. Of its seven main galleries, only 
one is reserved for “special” or temporary displays, 
the other six are very long-term capital intensive 
exhibitions. And today they are completely filled 
with displays.
• The CWM’s theme structure is largely chronological, 
episodic, and nationalistic. In the permanent 
exhibits galleries visitors move ahead through 
sections of time from pre-contact aboriginal warfare 
to modern day international interventions. In each 
of these main sections, the storyline identifies key 
battles or geopolitical events that, by and large, are 
either claimed or implied by the curators to generally
have advanced Canadian nation-building in their 
times. And these are huge historical episodes that 
are given summary rather than comprehensive 
treatment. Because all the initial capital was 
invested in permanent exhibits that literally filled 
the War Museum’s galleries, there is not anywhere 
enough display space or money in reserve to do 
more — at least in the conventional way.
No exhibit wall is large enough to carry the number of words
needed to describe even Canada’s role in strategic bombing,
nor is there sufficient gallery volume anywhere to portray the
images, artifacts, documents, or artworks required to authen-
ticate such an episode. Instead, the CWM must look to other
forms of expression to tell this story. (Indeed, this equally
applies to many of the major episodes it chooses to portray).
First, the CWM needs to install a series of small studios or
ateliers adjacent to the main traffic path. In these new
spaces there should be a host of study materials easily acces-
sible to visitors who want to both probe into a topic and
reach a satisfactory conclusion on their own. In short, these
new spaces are to be like mini-libraries that contain suffi-
cient information to properly cover a historical subject such
as “strategic bombing”, and not just from a Canadian point-
of-view. Books, articles, VHS, CD ROMs, Internet — this is
how the CWM can economically condense all the data needed
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to properly present controversial topics, as long as it creates
the physical spaces visitors require to search and study.
Second, the CWM should hire a staff of assistant curators
with history degrees to staff these spaces. Their roles would
be twofold: develop the databases and guide visitors in their
use, including an ability to converse one-on-one on subjects
like strategic bombing.
These two new means of expression (databases and their
experts onhand) could truly be a “specialty of the house” 
at the CWM. It would also be a labour rather than capital
intensive solution and an infinitely more flexible way to
describe and interpret extremely complex or highly controver-
sial historical events. Displays of artifacts, documents, and
images backed by written text or even firsthand audio-visual
accounts cannot always be relied upon to instruct visitors on
what transpired, nor convince them of the morality involved.
Often the historical and moral issues require extensive 
probing and reflection of one’s own findings. Such issues
merit exhibits, an exhibit layout, and even discussion with
knowledgeable interpreters in order to create a museum 
experience that can engage visitors more deeply in their
understanding of the past. 
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The CHA-SHC- affiliated History of Children and Youth Group
wishes to announce a new article prize. This award honours
the pioneering work of Professor Neil Sutherland in the field
of history of children and youth by recognizing outstanding
contributions to the field. Articles illuminating the history
of children and youth published in scholarly journals and
books are eligible, in French or English, with no restriction
on time period or geographic context. The award of $200.00
will accompany the prize which will be given out on a bien-
nial basis beginning in 2008. The inaugural prize will be
awarded in conjunction with the 2008 meetings of the
Canadian Historical Association at the University of British
Columbia in June. For further information, please visit our
website: http://www.edst.educ.ubc.ca/HCYG/
Mona Gleason and Tamara Myers
NEW PRIZE ANNOUNCEMENT
Neil Sutherland Prize for the Best Scholarly Article 
published in the History of Children and Youth
